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13. TRANSFER OF TRAINING AND SIMULATOR QUALIFICATION
OR
MYTH AND FOLKLORE IN HELICOPTER SIMULATION
JACK DOHME
I noticed something yesterday--perhaps others in the
audience did too. Have you seen any young kids come up
here and address this body? It would be, perhaps, impolite
to note that gathered here are the grand old men of the
field, that is, considerable experience is represented.
So...I got to wondering why Bill Larsen asked me to
speak. I'm not a test pilot; I'm not a graduate engineer; I
don't have 10,000 hours experience beating the air into
submission. However, it occurred to me that I wear trifo-
cals so I'm certainly not a kid. I carry an AARP
(American Association of Retired Persons--minimum age
50) card in my pocket so I guess I'm old enough. And we
do have a perspective at "Mother Rucker" (The Army
Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama) that may be
worth sharing. So, I changed the title of my presentation
this morning to "Myth and Folklore in Helicopter Simula-
tion." This presentation has a second author, my boss,
Chuck Gainer, and I should note that he contributed ideas
but did not suggest the mode of this presentation. In
summary, I suspect the real reason that Bill Larsen asked
me to address this august body is for comic relief.
Table 1 is intended to present some political stuff, to
stir up trouble and to get people to think about the issues
in that X-rated document we've been asked to read, the
"AC 120-XX." I thought I would begin by listing three of
what I'm calling "myths" in the field of helicopter simula-
tion. In discussing these myths, the "straw man" that I'm
attacking wears green and I think that's fairly safe in this
audience.
Let's look at myth l: "A Simulator Should Look,
Taste, and Smell Like a Helicopter." An IP (Army
Instructor Pilot) once kidded me that, "If it don't smell
like JP-4 (jet fuel), it couldn't be no good." Well, what is
the objective of simulation? Is it to look, taste, smell, and
feel like a helicopter? Let me answer that question with
three examples: The Crew Station Research and
Development Facility (CSRDF) at NASA Ames is an
engineering simulator, right? Could you train somebody
Table 1. Myths in helicopter simulation: myth 1
Simulator should look, taste, and smell like a helicopter
Must determine the objective of the simulation
Crew station design/man-machine interface; CSRDF
Combat training technology/user requirements: SCTB
Primary training technology/train neophytes: UH-1TRS
Must define fidelity to meet the objective
AGARD Working Group (Key 1980)
I. "Objective fidelity" - simulator reproduces measurable aircraftstates or conditions
2. "Perceptual fidelity" - degree to which Ss perceive the simulator to duplicate aircraft states or
conditions
STI definition (Heffley et al. 1981)
"Simulator fidelity is the degree to which characteristics of perceivable states induce correct psychomotor
and cognitive control strategy for a given task and environment"
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in it? Sure you could, but that's not its purpose. It was
created to address questions in crew station design. The
Simulator Complexity Test Bed (SCTB at ARI, Fort
Rucker) is a $24 million toy that is coming to Fort Rucker
this year. Initially configured as an Apache, it has red-
station/blue-station training capability beyond any heli-
copter simulator in existence. It is an ideal device for
developing advanced combat training. It is a trainer, but it
is more of a training research tool. It is not an engineering
simulator, not directly.
Moving from the sublime to the ridiculous, how
about "Cheap Charlie," the UH-ITRS? It is a trainer, pure
and simple. You cannot start it, you cannot fly an ILS
with it, it does not use fuel, that is, we don't currently
drive the fuel gauge. But, it trains "hands and feets," neo-
phytes, kids off the street. In other words, it has evidenced
significant positive TOT (transfer of training) to the 15I-I-1
aircraft using neophyte pilots as research subjects. I think
we should keep the objective of a given simulation in
mind as we review our ideas today.
Once we have decided on the objective of a given
simulator, an associated issue is the question of simulator
fidelity. I brought some of my favorite definitions that I
think are worth reviewing (table 1). Dave Key, who was
in the audience yesterday, was the key player, no pun
intended, in the AGARD working group in 1980, when
they distinguished between "perceptual versus objective
fidelity." The issue here is, do you want to measure what
the simulator does and compare it with the aircraft, or do
you want to measure what the "bus driver" does and com-
pare pilot responses from the simulator to the aircraft? I
think the latter is more appropriate, at least from a
trainer's perspective.
The definition we most commonly use at ARI is that
set forth by Heffley and a cast of thousands at Systems
Technology Incorporated (STI). STI did a report for us
that defined fidelity as "the degree to which characteris-
tics of perceivable states induce correct psychomotor and
cognitive control strategy for a given task and environ-
ment." Although I worry about the word "correct," I think
this definition is worth considering; it focuses on the bus
driver and not _on the bus,
While we are reviewing the issues involved in simu-
lator fidelity, I think it is worthwhile to reconsider Vernon
Carter and Clarence Semple (table 2). When I first read
their definition of "error fidelity," I thought, what kind of
nonsense is that? Any good psychologist knows about
error-free learning. But then, I thou_ght the definition and
saw that it has several important advantages. Looking at
the error distribution th_a_t_studentsmake in a simulator and
in the aircraft places the focus on the behavior of trainees,
with the ultimate goal being "good" performance in the
aircraft. Although this definition is specific to training
simulators and not engineering simulators, it does suggest
a metric for simulator evaluation...training errors.
At the bottom of table 2, I've included a reminder
from Ed Eddowes and Wayne Waag: "There is no com-
pelling relationship between training eff_tiveness an.d
fidelity/realism." Th.at's the kind of statement I'd like to
use as a final examination question. We could ask the
students to react to it as either true or false and then write
a short essay to support t_heir choice. The students could
get 100% credit for agreeing or disagreeing, depending on
the strength of their arguments. I think I would disagree
because training effectiveness is a practical definition of
fidelity. If a simulator trains, it has fidelity...who cares
what it looks like?
Table 2. Myths in helicopter simulation: more myth 1
Carter and Semple (i976)
"Error fidelity" -assumes objective is training
1. Trainees make same errors in simula_tor and aircraft
2. Relative frequency distribution of errors same in both simulator and aircraft
3. Effect of trainee errors on system performance is same in both simulator and aircraft
Advantages of concept
1. Focus on .behavior of trainees
2. Recognizes ultimate goal - performance in aircraft
3. Suggests a metric - training errors
A reminder (Eddowes and Waag 1980)
"There is no compellin_ relationship between training effectiveness and fidelity/realism"
i i
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Table 3 suggests a second myth: "The engineering
test pilot knows best." In this myth, the bad guys are not
people like Roger Hob, they are the green-suited simula-
tor test pilots. We all know how the Army goes about
accepting a helicopter simulator for training. There's a
procedure called Operational Test-2 (OT-2) in which a
would-be expert, usually a senior warrant officer with a
lot of time in the airframe, is assigned to make subjective
judgments regarding the simulator's handling qualities. I
don't necessarily mean Cooper-Harper ratings but some-
thing more subjective than that. Then the software is
"tweaked" to satisfy the judgment of the "expert pilot."
This is the way simulators are accepted into the Army
inventory.
Is there anything wrong with this approach? Yes
there is! The smart folks at STI, Hogue, Jex, and
Magdelano evaluated the Army's UH-60 simulator. The
UH-60 simulator has a six degree of freedom (DOF) syn-
ergistic motion base, but the STI report noted that as a
result of the OT-2, two of the degrees of freedom were
"tweaked" entirely out of existence! Specifically, the sim-
ulator has only pitch, roll, yaw, and heave. It has no
measurable sway or surge. The Army owns 18 UH-60
simulators, 17 in the field and one at the factory in
Binghampton. And none of them exhibits more than four
DOF. Is that what improving simulator fidelity is all
about? It doesn't make sense to me. But, if we're going to
attack this green straw man, let me offer an alternative.
Yesterday, Ken Cross (Anacapa Sciences) offered
"backward transfer" as an empirical yardstick with which
to evaluate existing simulators. Senior aviators performed
emergency touchdown maneuvers in the AH-I Cobra
aircraft until they met published criteria. Then they flew
the same maneuvers in the AH-I flight simulator: 58%
failed one or more maneuvers. The backward transfer
ratios were relatively low, ranging from 0.16 to 0.43.
Since the aviators had been qualified in the aircraft within
the past few days, it is unlikely that they "forget" how to
accomplish the maneuvers. It is more likely that the skill
requirements in the simulator and the aircraft are not the
same. As Ken Cross noted, the existence of positive TOT
data does not necessarily mean that the simulator is effec-
tive. The OT-2 report on the AH-1 simulator (by Bridgers,
Bickley, and Maxwell) cited some evidence of positive
transfer to the aircrarft and yet look at the results of the
backward transfer study. Positive TOT alone may simply
reflect some procedural transfer to the aircraft while
obscuring a substantial aerodynamic deficit that will limit
the overall training efficacy of the simulator.
Can we improve on the subjective pilot opinion
method of evaluating a simulator's effectiveness? I think
so. Let's look at Stan Roscoe's transfer effectiveness ratio
(TER) (table 4). As an example from our Cheap Charlie
research, we took a random sample of 10 Army officer
trainees and dragged them kicking and screaming into the
UH-1TRS where we substituted 9 hours of simulator time
for 9 hours of aircraft time. We trained them to published
criteria in the simulator (three successive maneuver itera-
tions that met the Flight Training Guide standard) and
then we employed the same criteria on the flight line in
Table 3. Myths in helicopter simulation: myth 2
"The engineering test pilot (or SIP or Eagle Scout) knows best"
Army acceptance test procedure
1. Assign an "expert"
2. Subjective judgment of handling-qualities/training features
3. "Tweak" the software
Outcome (Hogue, Jex, and Magdaleno 1982)
1. UH-60FS has six DOF synergistic motion base
2. Only four DOF (no sway or surge)
3. Army has 17 fielded UH-60FSs with four DOF motion bases
Alternative approach: empirical yardstick to evaluate existing device - backward transfer
Example (Kaempf and Blackwell 1990)
1. Trained to criterion in AH-I Cobra (ETMs)
2. Flew AH-1FWS: 58% failed one or more maneuvers
3. Backward transfer ranged from 0.16 to 0.43
4. Demonstrates skill requirements different in aircraft and simulator
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the aircraft. We compared them with a control group of
students who did not have simulator training. I've
included a kind of "middling" example, traffic pattern
flight. We found that the control group required about
21 maneuver iterations to meet the standard whereas the
experimental (simulator-trained) students required about
13. That savings of about eight maneuvers on the flight
line can be divided by the "cost" of producing the savings:
about 13 iterations in the simulator. Thus, the TER for
that manuever is 0.60. This could be interpreted as mean-
ing that the simulator was about 60% as effective as the
aircraft, using the aircraft as the criterion measure.This
metric has the advantage of measuring "in vivo" training
effectiveness of actual flight students embedded in the Ini-
tial Entry Rotary Wing (IERW) training program.
Let's look at the final myth: "The more features the
better" (table 5). Here, we tread on some hallowed
ground. My favorite example, after 14 years at Fort
Rucker, is in the area of motlon-base requirements. I
recall the Singer-Link folks telling the Army that the cost
of a simulator motion base adds only 2% to the total
device cost. To evaluate that assertion, I'd like to develop
ROC (Required Operational Characteristics) requirements
for the LHX simulator specifying no motion base and
then, on the day of the best and final offer, add 2% to the
contract and say we changed our minds!
Anyway, the draft Advisory Circular 120-XX that
Dean Resch and I talked about requires a motion system
for acceptance, even for level A. Is there any evidence
that motion even contributes to training, let alone is
required for training? We've done two small-number
empirical evaluations at ARI using neophyte trainees, one
in 1984 using five students on motion and five without
motion, and one in 1990, with six on motion and six off.
All students were strapped in the simulator; we erected
the motion base in every case and students were not
informed (nor did they guess) that we were evaluating the
effects of motion on training. In both experiments, the
nonmotion students outperformed the motion students.
Now that evidence only pertains to Army ab initio (that's
a Latin phrase for "kids off the street") trainees learning
basic hovering and traffic pattern skills. However, our
Table 4. Myths in helicopter simulation: more myth 2
'1 '1 i i ,
To evaluate developingtechnol0gy: transfer-e(feciiveness ratio (TER)
Measure transfer of training "in vivo" - embedded in training program
Random sample of trainees
"Blind" evaluation of flight line - same criterion
Calculate TER:
TER = (Ca - Ea)_s
Example from UH-ITRS - traffic pattern:
TER = (20.7 - 13.2)/1_2.6 = 0_.60_.................
Table 5. Myths in helicopter simulation: myth 3
lrr m,J_1.
"The more features the better the simulator"
Motion base - the 2% myth
Draft AC-120-XX requires a motion system, even for level A
Small N research suggest motion may inhibit training
Instructional support features - unused/unusable
Auto co-pilot
Auto check ride
Recorded demonstrations
AAA reviews (1982, 1985)
Insufficient training data to justify acquisitions
Recommended training requirements - empirical basis
Identified,no "blade houC savings ,; ,, ......
i i J
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research agrees with the literature in finding no significant
training advantage for a motion base.
Another example would be Instructional Support
Features (ISFs). I'm short on time and won't discuss these
but table 5 lists three examples from the 2B24 Huey
instrument flight simulator that either don't work, are
virtually never used, or have been recently taken off-line
by the Army. Couldn't we have based the simulator fea-
tures on a research evaluation of the requirements instead
of just buying all the bells and whistles the manufacturer
could offer?
My third example of simulator features requires that I
bend logic a bit. In 1981, the Army Audit Agency (AAA)
came to Fort Rucker and evaluated simulator utilization.
Their 1982 report noted that the written premise for
procuring flight simulators had been "blade hour savings."
The folks from the AAA looked around Rucker and
couldn't find the money! The Command Group's answer
was that there was no intent to reduce flight hours but that
simulators were training multipliers. There's nothing
essentially wrong with viewing simulators as adjuncts to
"blade hour" training, except perhaps the inherent dishon-
esty. The AAA made two recommendations: first, that
Fort Rucker needs more training data to justify further
simulator acquisitions and second, that something as
expensive as Army aviation training should have an
empirical basis. Actually, the AAA said that Fort Rucker
can have simulators to experiment with in "the school-
house" but that procurements of simulators for the field
would be carefully scrutinized for appropriate training
requirements analyses and for empirical means of estab-
lishing simulator effectiveness. I think it's embarrassing
to have a bunch of auditors come around and tell the
trainers how to do their business. But it makes the point
that simulators should be designed, evaluated, and pro-
cured for effectiveness and not for a bunch of "gee whiz"
features.
So, what would we propose as an alternative? Again,
if you want to stir up a hornet's nest, you'd better have a
bug bomb. The philosophy behind our suggested approach
is to do a thorough, boring, tedious front-end analysis to
determine the training requirements based on the ultimate
criterion of mission readiness in the field (table 6). At an
initial level, that's not all that difficult to accomplish since
the Army's Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization
(DES) sends flight-skill evaluators worldwide for no-
notice evaluations. Thus, it should be relatively easy to
determine where the basic mission-readiness training
deficits are. Then, a cost-of-training-effectiveness-
analysis (CTEA) could be used to compare the training
cost of simulation, blade time, or a combination. In
summary, if you don't have a problem training the
maneuver or mission in the aircraft, don't design a
simulator to train it.
We can also try to design our simulators to be more
flexible...to anticipate future requirements. We don't
want to perpetuate the Army way: procure by publishing
requirements, discover that the requirements won't get the
training job done before the device is even fielded, initiate
a Product Improvement Program (PIP) to modify the
device to do what you originally intended (but didn't ask
for). The PIP system makes the Army look dumb and the
contractors look wealthy. We should be able to do better.
Can't we develop requirements with an eye to the future?
Can we design part-task trainers and modular simulator
designs in place of plenary simulators that are designed as
aircraft replacements? Can we do CTEAs to estimate the
effectiveness of simulators before we buy them?
Table 6. Myths in helicopter simulation: more myth 3
Alternative philosophy
1. Perform a front-end analysis
Training requirements: assess mission readiness in field
CTEA: Compare aircraft and simulator efficiency
2. Design/construct modular simulations - flexibility to meet changing requirements
Design for spare capacity - hardware/software
Use TOT evaluations of training effectiveness; iterate design
3. Design/construct part-task trainers instead of plenary simulators
Design to meet training requirements
Iterate design
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So let me go to my last point. In our shop, we call our
simulator Cheap Charlie because we don't want to be
taken too seriously, but also because we want to empha-
size that it's a low cost training tool and not a surrogate
aircraft. In a similar vein, I'll call our approach the ACME
"Fly by Night" Simworks to try to keep our attention
directed to doing useful and meaningful research related
to our charter; low-cost entry level helicopter flight train-
ing (table 7). I apologize for the pedestrian acronym,
ACME, but it may serve to keep our attention focused on
our research goals. Perhaps it has value to other simulator
designers, researchers, and users as well.
Table 7. Myths in helicopter simulation: still more
myth 3
ACME "Fly-by-Night" Simworks and Oyster Bar
Analyze - does it meet requirements? (CTEA)
Combat - does it address Army mission?
Modular - is the design flexible?
Evaluate - does it train ? (TOT)
My wife and I don't watch much television but we
have come afflcionados of the network show, Twin Peaks.
My hero, Special Agent Cooper, has a new enamorate...a
woman recently released from a convent, that is, an ex-
nun. Given her status, he decided to woo her with a joke
about penguins. There were two penguins on an ice flow
in Antarctica and one turned to the other and said, "You
look like you're wearing formal evening wear." The other
penguin said, "Maybe I am." The connection to fidelity in
simulation is obvious, right?
MR. DAVE GREEN: Just a quick observation with
which you can agree or disagree regarding your comments
about motion. I think what we say is that bad motion is
worse than no motion. When somebody tweaks a machine
to make motion, it was probably pretty bad motion. When
you get the kind of training you get by taking motion out,
it is because motion was a negative training feature.
Would you agree or disagree?
MR. DOHME: Well, I would pass the baton. The
question is, regarding our getting worse training with
motion than with no-motion, Mr. Green is saying that the
issue is probably that bad motion is worse than no motion.
I would agree that perhaps bad motion is worse than no
motion at all. However, we probably had a most thorough
evaluation of the motion system on the UH-ITRS by the
University of Alabama Flight Dynamics Laboratory
(FDL). The FDL engineers analyzed and tweaked our
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motion system and wrote a thorough report on their
efforts and I would refer you to that report since I' m not
an engineer.
The FDL engineers were convinced that our motion
base was doing as well as it could, given the limitations
inherent in simulating the motions of flight. For example,
the issue of washout. Is it subliminal or not? It wasn't that
we were naive regarding the issue of motion base fidelity,
and we did have simulator-experienced engineers develop
and tweak our motion-base equations as best they could. I
would be happy to provide a copy of the report; I think it
was done right.
MR. FRANK CARDULLO: I would like to follow up
on that comment a little bit further. Virtually every
transfer-of-training study that has been done about motion
has indicated that there has been no transfer. Unfortu-
nately, though, just about every transfer study on training
of motion has been done on bad motion systems. You
admitted yourself there were two degrees of freedom
missing.
MR. DOHME: No, not on the motion system we used
with the UH-1TRS. All five were working; as a matter of
fact, we had sway, which, it turns out, the original 2B24
doesn't have.
MR. CARDULLO: But, nevertheless, that one is a
fairly archaic motion system and the performance is poor,
and the cueing-out rhythms are poor. That has been virtu-
ally true of all the motion-transfer-of-training studies. I
think good motion-transfer-of-training studies should be
done, and I wish the impetus would come from the Army
or from your organization in particular to do a good
transfer-0f-training study on a good motion system.
MR. KATZ: Good suggestion, Frank. 1 am not here
to comment on the work that the laboratory did previ-
ously, but again, along this same vein, because obviously
your talking invites these comments, let me first of all
note that you did not say anything abut the effect of
motion on backward transfer. And you see you had the
problem of backward transfer, I assume, with motion.
DR. DOHME: Yes.
MR. KATZ: And then you had a problem with for-
ward transfer with the motion so it invites the hypothesis
that the bad motion as a matter of fact caused this. And
the thing that I think ought to be studied is to see if the
backward transfer would also improve by eliminating this
motion. And then I would make the hypothesis that if you
get your engineering work up to the level where the
backward transfer would be good with the motion that in
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this case also the forward transfer would be good with
that motion.
MR. DOHME: Interesting hypothesis. Those, of
course, are different vehicle we used for those two studies.
The backward-transfer work was done in Germany. It's
difficult to do that kind of in vivo testing in an active
military unit, but it is a good idea: A motion versus no-
motion backward transfer study.
MR. GERDES: My background is about 25 years of
simulation at Ames, ever since we had first fixed-base and
then motion-based simulators. And I have extensive expe-
rience on our five, six and three degree-of-freedom simu-
lators. I'm only saying this to give you some qualifica-
tions for what I am about to say.
First of all, I agree very, very highly that no motion is
better than bad motion. That is what we have been saying
for years. Second, motion comes into play or is useful in
an engineering simulator, perhaps more so than in a
training simulator, where you are looking for, say, the six
and one half boundary, the boundary where controllability
or emergency control of the aircraft or helicopter is impor-
tant. Then motion feedback to the pilot is extremely
important for the engineering pilot to assess what the
control problem might be. Third, about five years ago, I
participated in a simulation on our VMS, which has plus
or minus 30 feet of vertical travel. It is a six degree-of-
freedom and we did an autorotation simulation. I think it
was for this particular theme we are looking at, but for the
Army; in other words, are simulators useful for training?
And the autorotation maneuver was critical, extremely
hard to perform and learn and so forth. That one simula-
tion was probably the one that stands out most in my mind
as to where motion, and it was good motion, played a
very, very important part in this training business.
I was able, with practice, to make a whole series of
autorotations down to a fairly reasonable area and this is a
vertical motion simulator. So you have this stress that
others here have talked about. There is a simulator you
can break, so you try very hard. With the sound system
we had, we were able to give the pilot cueing for the rotor
sounds. When we pitched up to flare, we got the motion
travel to give us the deceleration and we had to doctor up
the visuals a little bit. We had to put in a couple of vertical
towers for visual height perception.
We did have a fourth window, a chin bubble, we
could see through as you could on a Huey. We could do
some fantastic things as far as accurate touchdowns are
concerned. This was not training, this was an engineering
simulation in which we varied disk loading, weights,
winds, all of these things. We did a whole matrix of
autorotations under difficult conditions, and all of them
turned out really well and defined boundaries and so forth.
I am saying all this because motion, when properly
used, is very good for training, as well as for engineering
simulations.
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